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Recent studies of North American and Latin American evangelical-
ism suggest that the ideology and politics of charismatic and
legalistic-literalist fundamentalist groups differ with regard to
gender relations. Although both advocate patriarchal structures of
authority, women in charismatic groups can negotiate gender rela-
tions more actively, thereby promoting their own interests. Applying
this basic distinction to evangelical groups in South Korea, however,
suggests that differences among the outcomes for women depend on
preexisting structures of authority rather than the type of fun-
damentalism. When patriarchal structures of authority, especially in
the family, still function, the differences between charismatic
and legalistic-literalist fundamentalism become minimized. How-
ever, when these structures are breaking down or already have eroded,
charismatic types of fundamentalism offer women a stronger voice
and greater opportunities to renegotiate gender relations than do
literalist-legalistic ones.
Much attention has been paid over the last two decades to the dra-
matic global resurgence of highly politicized religious movements.
Given the traditional expectations of secularization, these events have
surprised many and numerous conferences and publications have been
organized recently in an effort to understand these phenomena.1 Based
on the differentiation and rationalization of modern and modernizing so-
cieties, religion was supposed to be replaced in part by science, or limited
in its significance to the private sphere. Others expected religious values
to become the foundation of a general morality beyond any denomina-
tionalism.2 But very few anticipated the reemergence of attempts by reli-
gious groups to gain political power or even conquer the state in order to
implement a social order supposedly based on eternal, timeless principles
prescribed by their religionÂ—what Nikki R. Keddie labels "new religious
politics" and others call "fundamentalism."3 What has been even more
puzzling is the active participation of women in religious movements that
advocate a return to or strict enforcement of patriarchal structures of au-
thority and morality.
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Much of the surprise regarding the resurgence of religion and the
participation of women in fundamentalist movements has been due, on
the one hand, to a conventional and broadly functionalist understanding
of religion, and, on the other hand, a somewhat abstract and socially
noncontextualized image of patriarchalism. Both are based on ethnocen-
tric notions of modernization, progress, and history.4 In order to better
understand both events (which we regard as interrelated), theorists need
to revise the concepts of religion and secularization as weU as abstract
Western emancipatory models which were developed under very specific
social, political, and historic circumstances. Women's active participation
in recent fundamentalist religious movements urges us to reaUsticaUy iden-
tify their interests under given political, cultural, social, and economic cir-
cumstances and constraints, a task several authors recently have
undertaken.
Most attention has been paid to poUticized Islamic movements, a fo-
cus that has contributed to stigmatization of Islam or to the false impres-
sion that new religious politics is a predominantly Muslim phenomenon.
To correct these notions we focus on similar Protestant movements in Latin
America, North America, and South Korea. Moreover, this article empha-
sizes that new religious politics covers only certain types of religiously
legitimated patriarchal gender politics.
The growing Uterature on Pentecostalism and evangelicalism, espe-
cially in Latin America, is of great significance to the understanding of
women's participation in patriarchally oriented religious movements, of-
fering valuable insights into the social, economic, and cultural contexts of
religious gender politics. Although most Pentecostal and evangelical
groups reject direct involvement in poUtics and do not want to pressure
or conquer the state, scholars have characterized them as attempts of
largely lower-class women to restructure and remoralize the patriarchal
family against the destructive forces of machismo.5 A comparison of seem-
ingly apolitical movements and supposedly more political fundamental-
isms may help us to better understand the involvement of women in both
kinds of religious groups. Moreover, although apolitical at present, the
domestic gender politics of charismatic grassroots movements may be-
come poUticized under certain circumstances and may have great politi-
cal effects over time.
In this article, we first address the issues of secularization and the
global resurgence of religion, and offer a definition and typology of fun-
damentalism. Second, we turn to two types of patriarchally oriented reli-
gious groups: pohtically active legalistic-Uteralist fundamentalism and less
obviously political charismatic fundamentaUsm. The Uterature on North
American and Latin American fundamentaUsm suggests that charismatic
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movements tend to represent a self-organization of women actively at-
tempting to reshape the patriarchal family in their own interest, whereas
legalistic-literalist fundamentalism tends to represent the self-
organization of men who compensate for loss of authority and status by
increasing their control over women. Although this opposition may have
some merit in North American and Latin American contexts, it is exagger-
ated and does not account for the motivation either of men joining charis-
matic groups or women joining legaUstic-literalist groups. Furthermore, a
comparison to the South Korean case suggests that men can dominate
equally charismatic fundamentalism and legalistic-literalist fundamental-
ism. We conclude that different outcomes depend less on the type of fun-
damentalism than on existing authority structures. When patriarchal
structures of authority, though threatened, still function in the family,
workplace, and gender relations, literalist-legalistic as well as charismatic
types of fundamentalism tend to affirm and stabilize male authority. When
patriarchal structures of authority either break down and are transformed
into nonpatriarchal partnerships or degenerate into machismo, gender re-
lations can be renegotiated. When this is the case, one can observe two
major differences between charismatic and literalist-legalistic groups. Al-
though both types of fundamentalism advocate strict patriarchal author-
ity and morality, charismatic fundamentalism offers women a stronger
voice and greater opportunities in the renegotiation of gender relations
than literalist-legalistic fundamentalism. Moreover, this process tends to
take different forms. Literalist-legalistic fundamentalism often organizes
itself in terms of new religious politics, whereas charismatic fundamen-
talism focuses more narrowly on domestic relations.
Secularization and the Global Resurgence of Religion
Secularization has been defined in different ways: as institutional dif-
ferentiation, where religious and state institutions are separated by law;
as a decline in the plausibility of religions to provide structures of mean-
ing due to the progress in scientific explanations; and as the reduction of
religious significance to the private sphere. No matter how one under-
stands secularization, the recent resurgence of religious movements ren-
ders these ideas highly problematic, since they are based on a rationalist
and functionalist understanding of religion. Confronted with the global
resurgence of religious movements, most conventional theories deny em-
pirical evidence one way or another, either claiming that secularization
never really took place, or that the reemergence of religious movements
over the last decades is actually part of the secularization process. It seems
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obvious to us that both secularization and the return to religion not only
have taken place but are interrelated.
In order to better understand and explain both processes, we shift
the emphasis from a theological or philosophical focus to a more prag-
matic perspective which analyzes religions in terms of cultural systems of
crisis prevention and management.6 Religious practices are based on two
core assumptions: First, there exist superhuman powers or extraordinary
forces which control dimensions of life beyond direct human control; sec-
ond, religious actors gain access to these powers through culturally specific
means. Religious practices are thus culturally patterned attempts to ac-
cess "higher powers" in order to prevent crises or cope with them when
they have occurred.7
Religious practices are, of course, interlinked with and shaped by the
social and institutional order of any given society. How a society defines
and frames crises and which coping strategies and modes of mediation it
regards as appropriate, who controls the legitimate means of religious
mediationÂ—all these are socially regulated and objects of institutionaliza-
tion and division of labor. In these respects, reUgious systems function
much like political systems of authority; they offer complex repertoires of
beliefs and practices which can be instrumentalized selectively not only
for the legitimation of authority and privilege, but also for their
delegitimation and transformation. And religion, in turn, can contribute
to the shaping of the social, economic, and political order.
Seen from this theoretical perspective, secularization has taken place
as a consequence of increasing human control and "world-mastery." Most
important, massive expansion of scientific knowledge, advances in medi-
cine, and expansion of the welfare state have immensely reduced the risks
and threats and, consequently, the relevance of religion. However, in part
simultaneously and in part consequently, new dimensions of uncertainty,
risk, and powerlessness have opened up. Science and technology have
not only extended our control of nature, but also have created such new
risks as environmental catastrophes or the threat of atomic war. Democra-
tization not only has profaned poUtics but has opened up opportunities
for charismatic leaders to mobilize mass support, often in reaction to the
failures or problematic effects of Western liberalism or socialism. Capital-
ism as a revolutionary force has made labor a commodity, exposed people
to market uncertainties, destabilized existing family structures, and in-
creased social and spatial mobiUty. Accordingly, these instabilities have
been the source of the formation of new reUgious groups and movements.
Seen from this perspective, religion appears as an arena where different
groups and categories of people address specific risks and attempt to re-
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negotiate social relations, structures of authority, and morality in the name
of higher powers.
Religious movements are particularly interesting, since they are re-
sponses of definite social groups to perceived social crises. Most impor-
tant, moments of crisis lead to a redefinition of what adherents to these
movements beUeve their higher powers want them to do to restore the
natural, bodily, social, or cosmic order. Since the knowledge of the will of
these powers is only accessible through certain procedures, competition
exists among different individuals, groups, and categories of people claim-
ing authoritative knowledge of the ideal social, moral, and political order
that the religion demands.
In general, there are two major religious reactions to the crises of
modernity: Utopian and mythical.8 Both claim to return foUowers to the
origins of their religion, but the Utopian solution tries to retrieve its
liberating spirit in order to transform the given society, whereas the mythi-
cal solution proposes a return to legal code in order to restore divine or-
der, or, additionally, to recapture the ancient community's revelatory
experience. Utopian reactions tend to advocate more egaUtarian social and,
especially, gender relations, whereas mythical reactions tend to favor tra-
dition, hierarchy, and patriarchal authorityÂ—what we call "fundamental-
ism." Within this concept we distinguish further between legaUstic-Uteralist
fundamentalism on the one hand, and charismatic fundamentalism on
the other. The former centers exclusively on rigorous religious conduct,
which is combined in the latter with ecstatic experience.
Fundamentalisms and the Crises of Modernity
The resurgence of religious movements on a global scale is an indica-
tor of dramatic social transformations. Often, these movements are inter-
preted as reactions to and protest against modernity. We find such analyses
too general, and propose instead to read the ideologies and actions of
religious movements as an articulation of protest by definite groups of
people against very specific features of modernity, most likely those expe-
rienced in negative terms. Thus, it is of significance that over the last de-
cades a great number of religious movements in the United States and
worldwide has articulated as their central concern problems of the family
and gender relations, of sexual and social morality. Although one should
not reduce the complexity of these movements to a single issue or ignore
other agendas, it seems safe to state that family and gender relations
have been the single most important topic recently addressed by religious
movements.
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Many recent reUgious groups advocate strict, patriarchal structures
of authority, morality, and gender relations.9 This is true not only for less
industrialized countries, where patriarchal authority remains widely in-
stitutionalized, but also in such advanced capitaUst countries as the United
States, where even highly educated, middle-class women join neo-
patriarchal religious groups and support their antifeminist agendas.10 Our
approach suggests that the protest and ideals articulated in neopatriarchal
ideologies should be taken seriously as indicators destabilizing and threat-
ening dimensions of life experienced by those who join such movements.
One should not assume, however, that protest is based on homogeneous
experiences of eroding family structures, or that neopatriarchal ideals re-
fer to a homogeneous imagination of social order. Rather, the concrete
meanings of both protest and ideals vary according to class, gender, age,
or ethnicity, and "fundamentalism" may disguise more than it explains
unless one delineates its unique and context-specific significance.
Many recent studies have contributed considerably to a more differ-
entiated view of such religious movements as fundamentalism,
evangelicalism, and Pentecostalism by pointing out the great diversity
among all religious groups that advocate patriarchal gender relations and
structures of authority.11 These studies, many of which focus on Protes-
tant Christianity in North America and Latin America, emphasize the dif-
ferences between more legalistic-Uteralist fundamentaUsts and charismatic,
Pentecostal groups. For example, Margaret Lamberts Bendroth argues
about North American Protestantism that, "although many holiness and
Pentecostal groups may rightly assume the fundamentalist label, the two
groups parted ways decisively in regard to the 'woman question/ For the
purpose of my argument, I have chosen to differentiate the main body of
fundamentaUsts from their charismatic conservative brethren. For although
to outsiders they appeared nearly indistinguishable, fundamentalists ab-
horred the use of women preachers in holiness churches almost as vehe-
mently as they opposed the practice of speaking in tongues."12 Others
have supported this view and, in a similar fashion, Elizabeth E. Brusco
emphasizes the difference between heavily charismatic and more conser-
vative Colombian evangeUcalism, especially in their effects on gender re-
lations and ideology.13 This article builds on such insights by looking at
the different conditions under which women in varied neopatriarchal re-
ligious movements address their specific concerns.
The literature suggests that for women in more charismatic groups
patriarchalism plays a different role than for those in more legalistic-
literalist ones. In charismatic groups, women more actively use patriar-
chal structures of authority to further their own interests, especially in the
restructuring of the family and remoralization of men. In Uteralist-legalistic
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fundamentalist groups, patriarchalism serves rather as an authoritarian
and oppressive instrument of male domination. Although we do not doubt
the accuracy of the reports on North American and Latin American fun-
damentaUsm and Pentecostalism, we would like to further explore these
differences and their causes, particularly the structural conditions under
which the emancipatory potential of charismatic fundamentalism for
women can be reaUzed. What makes Pentecostalism apparently more open
to the needs and interests of (lower-class) women? Can it be attributed to
doctrine, charismatic style, or a homogeneous lower-class composition?
Will it change over time into a more or even less rigid patriarchal struc-
ture? Is this picture of charismatic fundamentalism confirmed when we
look outside of the American context?
In order to study these questions, we first systematize the structural
characteristics of charismatic and legalistic-literalist fundamentalism, pro-
posing an ideal-typical juxtaposition between the two fundamentalisms
based on North American and Latin American case studies.14 By focusing
on the distinctive structures of each system and their consequences on
gender relations among charismatics and legalist-literalists, two central
and related questions arise: First, what counts as "political" for adherents
to the two traditions? Only the public space, or also the domestic space?
Second, who has the authority to publicly sanction whom? Are only men
entitled to publicly sanction female behavior, or can women also sanction
male behavior in public?15 In a second step, we use this model for the
analysis of comparable cases in South Korea where evidence suggests that
charismatic fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to more gender
equality.
Legalistic-Literalist versus Charismatic Fundamentalism
Social Composition
Both charismatic and legalistic-literalist fundamentalism associate on
the principles of shared religious beliefs and visions of social moral order
rather than shared class interests. Nevertheless, class composition impacts
their organization and ideology. Previous theorists assumed that the so-
cial composition of all kinds of fundamentalist movements was predomi-
nantly lower class. But recently this view has been challenged and modified
considerably. Nancy Ammerman has proven that contemporary legaUstic-
literalist types of Protestant fundamentalism can be solidly middle
class.16 And Martin Riesebrodt has shown that this type of fundamental-
ism often attracts a mixed-class clientele which reflects the varied social
composition of Protestantism in general.17 Only charismatic fundamen-
talism has shown a homogeneous lower-class profile.18 Tracing the emer-
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gence of American Pentecostalism from its Holiness background in the
early 1900s, Robert M. Anderson found that adherents were predominantly
lower class. Such religious movements often draw their strongest support
from the agrarian, artisan, and small entrepreneurial classes most adversely
affected by urban-industrial change.19
Women tend to be overrepresented in nearly all religious groups, but
more so in charismatic fundamentalism than in legalistic-literalist groups.
Cultural and class affinities based on education, income, and aspirations
affect gender solidarity, and, in legalistic-literalist fundamentalism, the
heterogeneous class composition divides women according to their edu-
cational background and agendas. Such differences have a major impact
on the organization, ideology, gender relations, and political understand-
ing of these movements.
Leadership and Religious Qualification
Fundamentalist movements are primarily lay movements, a fact of-
ten hidden because of the prominent position of preachers and, especiaUy,
religious legal expertsÂ—for example, in Iranian Shia fundamentalism. As
expected, the social composition of a movement has a major impact on its
leadership. Because legalistic-literalist fundamentalist movements tend
to be socially heterogeneous they are led most often by well-educated
middle-class men. First of all, religious qualification is measured, among
other things, by knowledge of sacred texts, religiolegal knowledge, ex-
egetical ability, and preaching, and middle-class men are most likely to
have such skills. They tend to be better educated theologically, and better
equipped to articulate an ideology that fuses different class segments into
one group.
In legalistic-literaUst fundamentalist groups, one finds a firmly insti-
tutionalized predominance of values which favor the middle class over
those of the lower classes, as well as men over women. Even if they are
numerically in the majority, the lower classes and women are generally in
a subordinate position. In her study of a fundamentaUst congregation in a
middle-class, northeast American suburb in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
Ammerman observes that women are completely marginalized from the
church's leadership structure, despite their numerical predominance and
comparable educational background to men. "To say that authority at
Southside [Church] is in the hands of men of God is quite Uterally true.
Women are so thoroughly outside the official power structure that an
all-male committee can be described as a cross-section of the congrega-
tion."20 In this church, the biblical model for social institutionsÂ—author-
ity and submissionÂ—is firmly established. This includes the deference of
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a congregation to the pastor in church, an employee to superiors at work,
a citizen to officials in the government, and a woman to her husband at
home. Similarly, Bendroth notes the consistent absence of female leader-
ship in conservative Protestantism in America over the past fifty years.
The orientations of evangeUcalism have become overwhelmingly mascu-
line, despite the fact that women have comprised two-thirds to
three-fourths of the members of Protestant denominations.21
Compared to more abstract, complex, and sophisticated ideologies,
which often are designed to appeal to people from different class back-
grounds, charismatic fundamentalist ideology tends to be simpler and
more direct, since it is supposed to appeal to people who share many ex-
periences and problems. Leaders of socially homogeneous charismatic
groups thus typicaUy possess similar educational achievements as the other
members. Furthermore, leaders' religious qualifications are not limited to
religious knowledge and pious conduct, but include and emphasize char-
ismatic experience. Whereas religious knowledge is often understood as
men's domain, especially in legaUstic-literaUst groups, charismatic expe-
rience is theologically gender neutral and often the domain of women.
Although men monopolize religious knowledge in charismatic groups,
women have access to leadership positions through their charismatic call-
ing.
The charismatic experience is central to Pentecostalism. Although
Pentecostals engage in biblical exegesis, direct, personal contact with God
through baptism of the Holy Spirit rather than intellectual understanding
of the Bible, is the ultimate goal of their practices. "True understanding of
Pentecostal doctrine always derives from intimate contact with God; ra-
tional analysis is always a weak and faulty tool when the analyst relies
solely upon his own natural intellectual powers."22 Charismatic religions
such as Pentecostalism historically have afforded women the most oppor-
tunities to occupy positions of leadership, and even prominence.23 Al-
though by no means in the majority, several female Pentecostal leaders,
such as Aimee Semple McPherson, have risen to positions of national lead-
ership and legendary renown based on their charismatic authority. Shar-
ing humble rural-agrarian origins with male leaders and their constituents,
these women typically defend their authoritative roles as special gifts from
the Holy Spirit. While most stopped short of arguing for ordination, they
clearly saw their calling as a sign of the spiritual outpouring that Old Tes-
tament prophets predicted for latter days.24
In contemporary Latin America as well, much of Protestantism's ap-
peal to the lower classes is due to its more egalitarian, democratic orienta-
tion, especially in contrast to Catholicism. One of the ways in which
Protestant churches distinguish themselves from Catholic churches is in
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their efforts to encourage women's fuller participation. In his study of a
Brazilian charismatic congregation, Jorge E. Maldonado writes, "the em-
powerment of couples in the leadership of the church and the recognition
of women as partners in the ministry have been of paramount importance
in a country where Catholicism traditionally requires that only celibate
men and celibate women reach the status of sanctity, piety, and ministry
through life based in a religious community or a monastery."25
Gender Ideology, Family, and the Religious Role of Women
In legalistic-literalist fundamentalism, women tend to be seen as less
qualified religiously than men and, at the same time, are prevented from
achieving religious qualification by circular, misogynist gender ideology.
Where men are seen as heroic, rational, moral, and responsible, women
are believed to be intellectually and morally weak, sexually dangerous to
men, and polluters of sacred spaces. They are forbidden to interpret sa-
cred texts and preach, or speak in public. Ammerman, for example, shows
that the fundamentalist church's exclusion of women from power is ac-
companied by strict and literal application of biblical injunctions against
women speaking in the church, as described in I Corinthians 14:35. These
proscriptions prevent women from playing a major role in decision mak-
ing and teaching in any situation where their husbands might be students.
Practically, this means that women cannot serve on committees and boards,
or even teach adult Bible classes.26
Describing the roots of antifeminist fundamentalist ideology in
America, Bendroth shows how in early dispensationaUsm the original sin
of Eve was used as the ultimate justification for women's inferior position
and character.27 With the belief that original sin could not be changed by
human beings, these early views reflected the idea that the nature of Eve's
sin revealed her original frailty and "moral disability," and confirmed the
wisdom of her subjection, making feminine subordination inevitable.
Dispensationalists also looked on women preachers and leaders, especiaUy
those in the Pentecostal traditions, with contempt, believing them to be a
"demonic counterfeit" lacking in true knowledge and wisdom.28
On the contrary, fundamentalists portrayed men as rational guard-
ians of doctrine, and fundamentalism was increasingly imbued with a
masculine ideal especially in an attempt to defend and distinguish it
from the "effeminate" faith of modern theology. Fundamentalism became
associated with an assertive masculinity that thrived on controversy
and was characterized by its hardheaded rationaUsm. Male leaders pro-
moted "ornamental womanhood," which frowned upon any activities that
took women from their appointed role in the home, and equated rational-
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ity with masculinity, of which women were incapable. Fundamental-
ism also affirmed nineteenth-century masculine ideals of boldness and
mastery, linking them to revivalism's emphasis on victory and power. "Î†
single man filled with the Holy Spirit can of course do what a thousand
cannot do without it. He is the strong man, the wise man, the effective
man.'"29
In charismatic fundamentalism, too, men and women's religious
knowledge is qualified differently, but they have equal access to charis-
matic gifts. Although women may not always preach, they can speak in
public when "moved by the spirit." Since the spirit enters women and
speaks through them, women cannot as easily be characterized in misogy-
nist terms as long as charismatic elements have not become institutional-
ized and controlled by men. In charismatic fundamentalism, man is not
necessarily a hero, but rather a sinner, drunkard, gambler, or womanizer
who has to be remoralized in order to become a responsible husband and
father.
Brusco argues that one of the most important functions of
Colombian evangelicalism rests in the revolutionary transformation of
family-level gender relations through women's domestication of men.
At the heart of women's attempts to reform men and reorient them to-
ward their families is reformation of their machismo behavior, which
includes drinking, womanizing, gambling, physical abuse, and individu-
aUstic (as opposed to famiUal) consumption patterns.30 Similarly, Lesley
Gill writes: "Yet, even as the church subordinates women, Pentecostal
doctrine also dictates rigid behavioral norms for men, and this serves to
reform male behavior in accordance with some of the needs and desires
of women. Married women and their children, for example, benefit from
an improvement in the material circumstances of their households be-
cause male resources previously spent on alcohol, cigarettes, gambling,
and extramarital liaisons are directed back into the domestic unit."31 Gill
also finds Pentecostal services in Latin America to be more participatory.
These churches often allow women, upon receiving the Holy Spirit, to
preach. "Women in this setting are not merely passive recipients of a reli-
gious message. They actively participate in the experience by singing and
directing hymns, receiving the Holy Spirit, testifying, and even preaching
on rare occasions."32
Differences in gender ideology that are related to foundations of reli-
gious qualifications have an effect on women's ability to access public re-
ligious discourse. They also point to other major differences between
charismatic and legalistic-literalist fundamentalists, namely their under-
standings of private and public, and their organization of space for resis-
tance.
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Public Discourse and the Political
The public discourse of legalistic-literaUst fundamentalism focuses
comprehensively on moral decay. According to such discourse, corrup-
tion permeates society and the aim of religion is to restructure moral or-
der through institutional and political means. Since women are often seen
as the sources of this moral decay, male control of women and their bodies
is prominent in public rhetoric.33 The domestic sphere and gender rela-
tions are subsumed under these regulations, but the emphasis is on men's
control of women and their bodies. As a consequence of this misogynist
view, women in legalistic-literalist fundamentalism have few religious
weapons to resist male authority. Because women are regarded as irratio-
nal, immoral, and religiously less knowledgeable and thus are excluded
from pubUc reUgious discourse, their sources for resistance primarily come
from outside the religious sphere. Men also control religious public space,
making it unlikely that concrete domestic problems of gender relations,
such as abusive male behavior, would be addressed there. ReUgious law
and morality regulate the domestic sphere, but it is private and super-
vised by the male head of the household.
For women in charismatic fundamentalism, however, there seems to
be more religious space and legitimacy for resistance. Since they are seen
as "more spiritual" than men, women possess a certain degree of religious
authority and can shame and sanction their husbands religiously, proving
female moral superiority.34 Most important, women can address domes-
tic problems in front of the congregation in the form of prophecy. John R.
Burdick explains this "classical source of female power in pentecostaUsm"
as follows: "Once a man converts, his wife enjoys unparaUeled safeguards
over his behavior. CrenÃ§a rejects all the elements of the male prestige com-
plexÂ—drinking, smoking, gambling, fighting, and adulteryÂ—as the work
of the Devil, and subjects men to discipline should they indulge in any of
these practices. Yet direct sanctions rarely need to be appUed, for caution-
ary tales are constantly circulating about sinners revealed by prophets in
front of the whole congregation."35
Since in charismatic fundamentalism the domestic sphere and gen-
der relations can be addressed through pubUc religious discourse, the
domestic becomes both public and impUcitly political. In line with the
findings of Brusco and others, Maldonado finds that Venezuelan funda-
mentaUsm utilizes traditional patriarchal ideology of family relations as a
means to deal with male absence from the family. By teaching men about
family management, with an emphasis on discipline, seriousness, coop-
eration, demonstration of affection, compassion, and, above all, responsi-
bility, patriarchal family ideology encourages male economic support and
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marital fidelity. He reports, "in a region where machismo has been part
of the fabric of the culture, the headship ideology may be perceived as
protection of women and children and the attempted easing of a heavy
burden from the shoulders of proletariat and subproletariat women."36
Women in legalistic-Uteralist fundamentalism have to use different
strategies in order to carve out a public space for themselves. Since middle-
class male criteria define religious qualification, women often use
these same legalistic-literalist strategies to legitimize their inclusion in
and admission to full membership, equal rights, or even leadership
positions. By doing so, they affirm male definitions of religious qualifica-
tion based on knowledge, rationality, and morality; they also confirm male
understandings of the political and the divide between public and do-
mestic. These movements thus give lower-class women far fewer oppor-
tunities to articulate their own specific interests than do charismatic
movements.
Ideal-Types and Their Uses
Typologies are not designed to be used as boxes in which empirical
cases have to fit. To the contrary, there are few cases that totally fit either
the charismatic or the legalistic-literalist type as described here. Ideal-types
as methodological tools are systematic exaggerations of features of social
phenomena which are regarded as particularly significant for the charac-
terization of differences. Although all cases fall somewhere in-between,
this is the strength, not the weakness, of the typological method since no
model can capture adequately the complexity of historical phenomena.
Instead, we must look at each case individually and analyze how and to
what extent it adheres to certain features of one type or another. We recog-
nize, however, that this can always be a matter of approximation only.
We base all the features represented here as an ideal-type of charis-
matic fundamentalism on earlier, less institutionalized phases of such
movements in North America and Latin America. As we know, however,
the more this type of fundamentalism gets institutionalized and charis-
matic experiences become controlled, the more it emphasizes patriarchal
authority.37 Even among lower-class Latin American Pentecostals, men
dominate the power structure of the churches.38 According to Melvin Wil-
liams, in charismatic black American churches where women have con-
siderable de facto power, they still are considered "inferior to men." God
may call women as well as men to deliver sermons, but there is a distinc-
tion between female missionaries' "teaching" and male ministers' "preach-
ing"Â—only men may stand in the pulpit to preach. Women missionaries
travel and deliver sermons in various churches, but can become well-
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known and prosperous only as long as they recognize their subservience
to a male "head."39
These features of charismatic fundamentalism offer useful clues to
their appeal for men. Despite the space they provide for women to nego-
tiate gender and status, the ultimate aim of charismatic religious congre-
gations is to restore family and social stability by reinstating patriarchal
structures of authority and morality. Remoralization of men can be attrac-
tive to them because in addition to allowing men to escape the often de-
structive pressures of machismo, it gives them a new honored status as a
responsible head of the family. Male conversion is "double-edged": al-
though it may present a victory for women, it also acknowledges the
soUdification of men's authority at home.40 As Salvatore Cucchiari observes
in his study of Sicilian Pentecostalism, while Pentecostal conversion for
women may represent a "struggle for gender liberation" and means of
"empowerment" in the face of crisis in the hegemonic gender system, men
"experience the church community as a haven of nonthreatened male honor
and privilege, as a revitalization of the prevailing system of patriarchy."41
Most legalistic-literaUst fundamentaUst groups provide women to a
certain extent, however, with opportunities to claim spaces in which to
address their concerns. In addition to allowing women to create their own
organizations and semiautonomous spaces, negotiations of gender rela-
tions stressing mutuality and partnership may occur, both in religious ide-
ology and practice, as Susan D. Rose's and Judith Stacey's studies of
contemporary evangelical women in the United States amply have dem-
onstrated.42 Even in more traditional societies, fundamentalism can be-
come a resource with which women can renegotiate the traditional
"patriarchal bargain" to their advantage, by being able to hold men more
strictly to their end of the deal.43 In other words, gender relations are not
fixed but negotiated in both types of fundamentalism. But depending on
the type, the opportunities and constraints as weU as the strategies and
outcomes will look different.
Charismatic Fundamentalism in South Korea
Since our ideal-types have been developed out of case studies of North
American and Latin American Protestant fundamentalism, South Korean
Protestantism provides a useful test case for their effects on gender poli-
tics under quite different conditions.44 As in Latin America, Protestantism
in South Korea represents a relatively recent reUgious transmission from
North America. First introduced in the late 1800s, ProtestantismÂ—of a
mostly fundamentalist, evangelical varietyÂ—exploded in South Korea
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during the rapid industrialization phase of the 1970s and 1980s, and pres-
ently claims close to 25 percent of the nation's population.45 Developing
under conditions of rapid social change similar to those in Latin America,
Protestantism has served many analogous functions in South Korea, not
the least of which has been its special importance to women attempting to
cope with the challenges of a rapidly transforming environment. How-
ever, the study of Protestantism in South Korea also provides an opportu-
nity to qualify findings regarding fundamentalism and gender relations
in Latin America. For women in South Korea, charismatic fundamental-
ism does not represent a vehicle for negotiation toward greater gender
equality within the church or the family, but, to the contrary, is a mecha-
nism that affirms and reinforces existing structures of patriarchal author-
ity and gender relations.
As in Latin America, churches in South Korea historically have been
known for their strong charismatic character, influenced, as many see it,
by the native shamanistic tradition centered on women.46 Although stron-
ger charismatic and Pentecostal elements can traditionally be found in the
lower-class congregations,47 one of the distinctive features of South Ko-
rean fundamentaUsm is that many of its churches, irrespective of their
class composition or denominational affiUation, display charismatic ten-
dencies. Jae Bum Lee has found, for example, that in South Korea, charis-
matic elements play a major role in some of its largest congregations, both
Pentecostal and non-Pentecostal, many of which possess a predominantly
urban, middle-class membership.48 In South Korea, however, these char-
ismatic elements have not served as a source for a transformation of patri-
archal structures of authority in these churches nor any notable changes
in the basic position of women.
Most lower-class churches, independent of denominational affiUation,
possess a strong charismatic orientation. Revealing strong Pentecostal
influences, many of them focus on baptism of the Holy Spirit and healing
practices. However, despite this strong charismatic nature and the numeri-
cal preponderance of women,49 a striking aspect of these churches is their
distinctly patriarchal culture. Similar to middle-class churches, lower-class
Korean churches are characterized by a rigorously patriarchal structure
and ideology that articulates clear subordination of women both in the
church and in the family.
One way in which patriarchal principles are expressed in Korean
Christianity is a nearly complete exclusion of women from almost all forms
of public authority and power within the church hierarchy. Unable to rise
beyond the position of deaconess, women are usually limited to such
woman-centered group activities as evangelism, home Bible study meet-
ings, and other support-oriented tasks. In the home, the strict fundamen-
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taUst ideology of the husband's headship and wife's obedience and sub-
mission is strictly applied and upheld.
Moreover, in spite of the centrality of the charismatic experiences in
many South Korean churches, this charismatic culture rarely provides a
means by which female interests are articulated or authority is exercised.
In general, these charismatic experiences are limited to serving as vehicles
for women's prayer and emotional and spiritual release. They rarely serve
as mechanisms for public sanction of male behavior or assertion of female
interests. In other words, one finds, even in lower-class, Pentecostal-type
South Korean churches, pervasive and stringent institutionalization of
patriarchal principles without the counterbalancing emphases on female
charismatic and moral authority that are more obvious in some Latin
American cases.
Many scholars have noted that a major source of Korean Protestant-
ism's patriarchal ideologies is Confucianism, whose principles all too eas-
ily have been adapted, along with shamanism, to fundamentalist
Christianity.50 The charismatic, utilitarian, and this-worldly tendencies
characterizing Korean Protestantism reflect the spirit of traditional sha-
manism, while the hierarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian character
of Korean Protestantism is, in part, an indigenization of Confucian ele-
ments.51 In terms of gender relations, the traditional Confucian worldview,
which asserts female inferiority while privileging motherhood, is fused
with contemporary fundamentalist views on gender. Trds results in a pow-
erful ideology which legitimates strict subordination of women while glo-
rifying her role as guardian of the family.
The ideologies and organizational structure of patriarchy are more
firmly institutionalized in middle-class South Korean churches, and re-
semble the North American model of traditional fundamentalist
churches.52 Indeed, in South Korean churches, reinforcement of existing
patriarchal ideals and structures is accomplished more systematically and
explicitly than in North America. For example, similar to family educa-
tion programs of American fundamentalist churches, many larger
middle-class churches in South Korea boast as the centerpieces of their
educational programs various types of family seminars designed to incul-
cate and reinforce traditional patriarchal family values. The values and
the model of family advocated in these seminars go beyond the ideal
nuclear "Christian" family of the West. They are based rather on the tradi-
tional Confucian Korean family ideal which, though transmuted into a
nuclear family form, strictly upholds patrilineal-patrilocal principles and
the obUgations and subordination they imply for women. The audience
for these seminars is mostly women.
Moreover, compared to their lower-class counterparts, the charismatic
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elements in middle-class churches are even more strictly contained. Al-
though women are allowed to display their charismatic experiences dur-
ing the religious service, these expressions are controlled and regulated
implicitly by the tight structure of the worship service, and women's equal-
ity of access to charismatic qualifications does not translate into more gen-
eral access to power or more egalitarian gender ideology. In fact, little
difference exists in South Korea between charismatic, middle-class con-
gregations and traditionally fundamentalist, middle-class congregations
in terms of women's relationships to men. Both reflect and embody the
patriarchal structure, ideals, and ethos of the larger society.
Contrary to Latin American experiences, female participation in Ko-
rean lower-class churches is less focused on curbing machismo (in the sense
of patriarchalism grown anomic53) than it is a means by which women
attempt to cope with the effects of an extremely patriarchal family struc-
ture. Although their difficulties also include male abandonment and abuse,
Korean women's central problems most often stem from the oppressive
restrictions and injustices of Confucian family structure, particularly the
mistreatment and harsh demands of in-laws and husbands.
In many cases, the severity of these problems results in the particular
crisis of the modern Korean family form in contemporary South Korea. At
the core of this crisis are contradictions arising from the preservation of
certain features of traditional family organization despite transformation
to a modern nuclear family and changed socioeconomic and cultural con-
ditions. Although women have high educational levels and modern egali-
tarian ideas regarding family, gender, and conjugal relations have spread
widely in South Korean society, the patriarchal structure and moral order
of the Korean family have remained remarkably intact. For many women,
the contradiction between their changed expectations and continued sub-
ordination and inferior treatment under the patriarchal family system has
generated an intensified sense of frustration and oppression. For some,
the severity of their problems has resulted in a variety of psychosomatic
illnesses.54
One major reason for South Korean women's participation in
evangelicalism is thus an attempt to obtain relief from these stresses
through participation in the practices of a religious community, thereby
expanding social networks with others in similar positions and striving
for other-worldly salvation. This is even more so for middle-class women,
who are more highly educated, and for whom the issue of machismo is
even less relevant. Ironically, however, the guidance churches provide for
these women leads to reinforcement of the very patriarchal system that
Ues at the heart of their problems. Upholding family order and harmony
as their primary goal, churches' solutions strengthen the principle and
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practice of female submission to patriarchal authority, illustrating the ex-
tent to which evangelical Protestantism in South Korea serves as a vehicle
for legitimation and preservation of middle-class, patriarchal gender or-
der.55
Given the intensely conservative nature of Korean evangelicalism,
why do Korean women so enthusiastically participate in evangelicalism?
An important part of explaining this question is to answer why Korean
women choose to accommodate or consent to religious patriarchy. Al-
though a full exploration of the answers to these questions is outside the
scope of this article, addressing the issues requires a culturally sensitive
exploration of South Korean women's options, interests, and choices as
shaped by the particular nature of the crisis of gender order in South Ko-
rean society; their position in the current economic and domestic struc-
ture; and their gender identities and subjectivities. For instance, it is
possible that for many highly educated, modernized women in South
Korea, the demands of the traditional family system are becoming increas-
ingly illegitimate and intolerable in the modern context. However, lack-
ing alternatives in a society that offers few economic opportunities for
women or other viable forms of self-identity, many South Korean women
may find that their best option lies in religious reinterpretation of the pa-
triarchal family.56
This is not to suggest, however, that South Korean women of aU classes
do not employ various strategies of resistance or self-empowerment
through reUgion. It is also not meant to suggest that women have no moral
or spiritual authority or autonomous space within the church and at home.
To the extent that all religions, fundamentalist or not, possess a contestatory
potential, South Korean evangelicalism provides some means for women
to negotiate relations of gender. It offers women a means to religiously
transcend and acquire meaning for their sufferings, gain a certain degree
of autonomy from men through their relationship with a higher power,
and even regulate the conduct of their husbands. As in Latin America, a
successful persuasion of husbands to convert can foster a change in their
behaviorÂ—less drinking and gambling, more attention to wife and dhil-
drenÂ—which improves family relationships.57 However, it appears that in
South Korea, greater family harmony and improvements in the domestic
situation are traded for further entrenchment of women's subordination,
submission, and sacrifice to men under the patriarchal system.
Conclusion: Reaffirmation versus Renegotiation
of Gender Relations
The North American and Latin American cases suggest that there can
be major differences in the construction of gender relations and articula-
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tion of women's agendas as well as in the character of their political in-
volvement between charismatic and legaUstic-Uteralist types of fundamen-
talism. At the same time, South Korean materials show that these different
outcomes are dependent less on the type of fundamentalism than on pre-
existing structures of authority. Our comparison suggests several hypoth-
eses. When patriarchal structures of authority more or less are still
functioning, then differences between charismatic and legalistic-literalist
fundamentalism become minimized and patriarchal features become pre-
dominant, even in charismatic fundamentalism. In these cases, different
degrees of politicization and understandings of the political are possible,
but they all tend to affirm, stabilize, and reinvigorate the existing patriar-
chal ideology and order in the family and other institutional contexts.
However, when the structure of authority in the patriarchal family breaks
down and gender relations have to be renegotiated, charismatic funda-
mentalism offers women greater space than legalistic-literalist fundamen-
talism, although renegotiations also go on within the latter. In this case, a
politicization (in the sense of Keddie's "new reUgious politics" ) is less likely
to happen; it is more probable that the focus stays on renegotiations of
gender relations within the patriarchal family model.
From our analysis, we conclude that it is insufficient to look at the
impact of religion on gender relations and their politicization in isolation
from the structures of authority in the family, and the political and eco-
nomic orders. We do not deny that religion plays an important role in
shaping and redefining gender relations. Our comparison, however, sug-
gests that existing structures of authority widely constrain the extent to
which religious repertoires have transformative effects of their own. But,
religion certainly has an enormous impact on the cultural forms patriar-
chal family and gender relations may take. Whether or not the model of-
fered here is valid beyond the cases considered remains to be seen.
However, it may be a useful step for further explorations into the dynam-
ics of religion and patriarchal gender politics.
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